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NOTES TOWARD A NEW MARITIME STRATEGY
George W. Baer
Admiral Michael Mullen, the Chief of Naval Operations, has charged us withthinking about how to redefine sea power in this era of hyperglobalization.
He asked us to think of a new vocabulary, a new frame of reference, to consider
what will take our maritime strategy beyond sea combat and enable a sound
public understanding of the Navy’s value. Or, as Vice Admiral John G. Morgan,
Jr., Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information, Plans and Strategy, has
said, the core question for us to answer at the end of this discussion is: “How will
sea power influence history in our time?” Put another way: What is the role of
the ocean, of American maritime armed forces, in securing American safety and
prosperity?
A NEW MARITIME STRATEGY?
This is not new a question. One hundred fifteen years ago, faced with similar
challenges of new technologies, globalization, and new naval threats, the found-
ers of the Naval War College, admirals Stephen B. Luce and Alfred Thayer
Mahan, answered the question with a new maritime strategy for the nation and
the Navy. They called it “sea power,” and it endured for a hundred years, a strat-
egy of sea combat, of sea control, and of power projection. We are following in
this tradition when we ask again today: What is the Navy for?
One goal of the new maritime strategy, then, is to establish and sustain public
understanding of the role we expect sea power to play in our time, to demonstrate
the link between American naval forces and the preservation of our way of life.
Of course, we have some general expectations of our naval policy. The Chief
of Naval Operations (CNO) has listed them: to adapt the service to the country’s
requirements in an era of hyperglobalization; to meet the threat of terrorism; to
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stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction; to deter or control a future peer
competitor on the sea; to support friends and allies; and to address maritime is-
sues in an era that is both transnational and state-centric in nature. These are
jobs the Navy must do to support our national policies.
Beyond these basic and essential naval requirements, is there anything more
that the Navy, and a maritime strategy, may do to help the nation in this era of
hyperglobalization? Establishing
our national maritime agenda is a
shared responsibility, shared be-
tween the public and the military,
between officers and civilians. This is so because we want to give a national an-
swer to the question of what the Navy is for.1
That was Mahan’s question, and it again is ours. Like his, our concerns mix
old and new, traditional maritime services and future needs. Like his, our new
maritime strategy has to have public as well as professional support. Sea power
then and today must be socially construed.
We all agree that the Navy is a combat force and that its missions generally are
to preserve free use of the sea, enhance global commerce, and secure our shores.
The first requirement for our fleet, then, as the basic condition of our new mari-
time strategy, must be broad preparedness for sea combat. But more may be
asked of it than sea combat.
The Navy must serve homeland defense, and it also must be ready to give hu-
manitarian assistance around the globe. It must support armed interventions
and also position itself for ballistic missile defense. It must deliver “fires” ashore
and also conduct constabulary duties. It must protect fisheries and also be ready
to fight an interstate war. It must enforce sanctions and also assist in sea-use
management. It may be called upon for offshore command and control in case
of a terrorist pandemic and also to monitor the cybersphere. I mention these
many and varied functions—some traditional uses of navies, some new, hard-
and soft-engagement missions—because all these are what the Navy must pre-
pare for. For all that, for our maritime environment, do we need a new strategy?
The answer is yes.
For starters, I think we should want to establish the widest possible national
understanding of the values we assign to the ocean. A national maritime strategy
will take into account more than just combat. The sea sustains our ecosphere. It
is essential to life on earth. The ocean is a vital venue of our commerce and
global culture, a source of essential protein, a domain of salutary recreation.
Some forty thousand merchantmen of over three hundred gross tons ply the sea
today. The U.S. Maritime Administration estimates that global maritime trade,
travel, and commerce will double in the next twenty years. Entire societies are
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dependent upon maritime commerce and upon food from the sea. More than a
hundred marine reserves have been established worldwide as habitats, reflecting
the need of a productive and resilient ocean. It is an ocean under stress. The
phyloplankton mass is diminishing, acidification is increasing. The number of
dead zones has increased by a third in just the last two years. The number of
these anoxic zones is now two hundred. Public and official discussions must
keep these facts in mind, for commerce and culture, ecology and food sources, as
much as politics and naval power, shape the values we—and others—place upon
the sea.
The ocean has value because it is an essential part of our common space. The
opening words of the recent 2004 report of the U.S. Commission on Ocean Pol-
icy express our position in the world: we are “a nation surrounded by and reliant
on the oceans.” We are on a water planet. Seen from space, the earth is largely
blue. The ocean is a single whole. The water of Narragansett Bay connects to the
Sea of Japan. Our life and well-being are affected by this global connection. For
that reason, our maritime policy must be holistic. A maritime strategy is Amer-
ica’s face to the sea.
We must now consider the ocean’s value from different perspectives. One is
seeing the ocean as what Mahan called the “wide common,” a space for the
movement of commerce, a place of food, of environmental health, and of recre-
ation, for use by all. Another perspective is to see that same ocean as military wa-
ter, either as a moat, a protective defensive barrier, or, alternatively, as a water
highway for offensive use. The point is that ocean water can be crossed in all di-
rections, so it can be a medium of trade, of military aggression, or of defense in
depth. It can be a common, a moat, or a highway. Our maritime strategy will de-
pend on what we want it to be.
IS THE OCEAN STILL A COMMON?
Yes. But it is an increasingly restricted and contested common.
It is a place of potential contest because sea space is not just geographical
space. It is also political space. Many states today are developing their own mari-
time strategies, either for protection or for armed reach. Nations make local eco-
nomic and security claims. Asian states seek stability near the Straits of Malacca.
Sweden protects the environment of the Baltic. India advances its influence in
the Indian Ocean. China wants to influence East Asian and perhaps western
Pacific seas. Recently President Hu Jintao of the People’s Republic of China
called for the building of a powerful navy prepared “at any time” for military
struggle, a navy fit for what he called China’s “military’s historical mission in this
new century and at this new stage.”2 North Korea threatens ocean movement in
the Sea of Japan. Australia and Spain worry about illegal immigration from the
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sea. Chile and Iceland think about fisheries. New Zealand’s exclusive economic
zone is fifteen times the land area of that country. Norway and Nigeria, to say
nothing of Iran and the Arab states, think about pumping and transporting oil.
As part of its nation, the United States claims almost 11.5 million square kilome-
ters of territorial waters.
Our claims are political as well as commercial: we project naval power across
the sea, throughout the globe, and that power may be contested. Last October a
Chinese submarine surfaced, undetected, within five miles of the carrier USS Kitty
Hawk in waters near Okinawa. It is possible that some states might create formida-
ble sea-denial capabilities and, perhaps, limited sea-control capabilities as well. If
that is the case, America may need
to continue to command the com-
mons, as only strong maritime
power can prevent such denial,
and once in command, influence
how certain ocean-directed states may develop: encouraging them to cooperate
or deterring their expansion. In the present world of many powers, and should
our land and air forces be restricted in access or effect, such influence at sea as
command of the common presents may be our best means of foreign policy
leverage, and hence the key to a future maritime strategy. The sea is and will
remain a political sphere.
But if the sea can be contested, it can also be a space for cooperation. Many
laws and agreements already apply at sea, and all shape, or suggest, a common
concern for the “wide common.” There are environmental protocols, the Inter-
national Seabed Authority, the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement, the UN’s
Law of the Sea Convention. The United States is not a party to the Law of the Sea
Convention, but we recognize the usefulness of cooperation and operate in ways
consistent with its provisions of navigation and overflight. Admiral Mullen
stated his policy on cooperation recently in Venice. It was, he said, “the maritime
forces of many nations working together for global maritime security, while
keeping the sovereignty of territorial waters secure as a core principle.”
“Good order at sea,” then, refers to a framework of agreements for living with
the unitary world ocean.3 A secure global maritime environment is in America’s
interest. Good order at sea will be an international construction, an iterative
process, a network shaped as much by agreement as by naval power. A coopera-
tive attitude is there to develop. For instance, today twenty-two countries partic-
ipate in the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, a group that is itself a direct
outcome of a suggestion for regional associations made by the American CNO
at an International Seapower Symposium held at the Naval War College twenty
years ago. In the words of Admiral Mullen, “As we build upon ideas like Theater
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Security Cooperation, the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Regional Maritime
Security Initiative, we find that every nation has a stake in security, and a distinct,
unique capability—as well as a great desire—to contribute.” If they have a stake in
security, they should have a stake in broader ocean management as well.
IS THE OCEAN A MOAT OR A HIGHWAY?
Of course it is both. The ocean as a moat, a military space, gives security space. It
offers defense in depth. But by the same token, as a body of water it permits of-
fensive use, permits maritime power projection. One can move both ways across
a moat. A moat can become a highway. Naval strategy is what determines how
the Navy will use the ocean, both for defense in depth and for access to foreign
ships and foreign shores.
For two hundred years America was favored by ocean space. We thought of the
sea as our protection, as our safety zone, our natural strategic depth. A French am-
bassador many years ago observed, “America is blessed with fish on one side, and
fish on the other.” But fish space is not enough: ocean space is again open to those
who master the technology of sea control and have the will to use it.
We are not invulnerable. Attacks against us have happened before. The
United States was founded in the face of the longest seaborne supply route be-
fore World War II, the greatest overseas expeditionary force yet seen by history,
launched against us in the War of Independence. We won that one, thanks to our
continental resolution and outside help, but our vulnerability to British sea
power remained as long as we lacked sea control. Depth in itself was not enough.
A few years after independence, in 1814, the British burned down Washington,
D.C.—destroying the Capitol Building, the White House, the National Archives,
and the departments of War, State, and Treasury—all, that is, destroyed by an
amphibious invasion force from across the sea. The United States could not de-
fend its own shoreline.
That is why, in 1890, searching for a new maritime strategy in a new techno-
logical age, Mahan said that the Navy had to reshape its force and its doctrine if it
was to be the true shield of the republic. Passive coastal protection was not
enough. We needed oceangoing battleships. The Navy had to become an offen-
sive battle fleet prepared and able to defeat an approaching enemy fleet in blue
water, away from American shores. Mahan’s strategy of sea combat and power
projection dominated American naval policy for the next hundred years. Sea
power meant we could fight our wars “over there” and beat anyone who chal-
lenged our use of the sea. The best defense of our coastline, Mahan said, was a
good offense, out to sea.
That strategy of maritime power projection held through World War I, World
War II, and the Cold War. The North Atlantic Treaty was named for an ocean,
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befitting its maritime sponsor. The Cold War was for the United States based on
a global maritime strategy meant to contain a continental opponent. The United
States became the protector of the ocean’s rimlands, a barrier against Soviet ex-
pansion to the sea. At the end of the Cold War we had total sea control. The
rimlands of the world were open to trade and to liberal values—our national
policy called for “enlargement and engagement.”
Then on 9/11 violent politics hit our shore with a stunning shock. The ocean’s
vastness and our prodigious military and intelligence forces had not safe-
guarded American soil. The meaning of security had changed. Now the national
strategy proclaimed that protective actions abroad and at home were indistin-
guishable and might have to occur simultaneously. The strategic distinctions
were blurred between offense and defense, between means and ends. Strategic
depth had to be established, not just enjoyed. The moat that secured the United
States from direct attack and the highway that secured our strategic access
abroad came to be seen as one and the same, as indeed they have always been.
That is to say, the expanse of the ocean does not in itself guarantee either se-
curity or access. Its strategic dimensions must be created. Strategic value is
something that must be imposed upon the sea. This is why our new maritime
strategy must emphasize full maritime domain awareness. That is why the Navy
will have a role in ballistic missile defense. That is why the Navy must operate in
cyberspace. That is why the Navy will rely on the Global Information Grid, on
new command-and-control capabilities, to confer strategic benefits, to use the
sea’s great capacity for maneuver to hit the foe before he hits us, to give us off-
shore control. Mahan would have approved of forward deployment, forward
presence to maintain strategic depth, to stop a threat before it materialized.
THAT BRINGS US TO: THE NAVY AND A NEW
MARITIME STRATEGY
We can start by remembering the geostrategic values that are conferred upon a
maritime state such as the United States, which is in a position that gives the
great strategic advantage of global exterior maritime lines of communication.4
A recent workshop at the Naval War College gave us a useful sea power syllo-
gism, emphasizing the value of a naval peripheral approach and what is strategi-
cally required.5 It was described as “the Periphery Syllogism”:
• Who commands the seas can exploit global maritime exterior lines.
• Who exploits global exterior maritime lines can attain the global exterior
maritime position.
• Who exploits the exterior position can prevent anyone else from
commanding the world.
2 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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To elucidate these issues, Robert Rubel, dean of the Naval War College’s Center
for Naval Warfare Studies, asked the College faculty members three questions.
Is the nation shifting from strategic defense to strategic offense? That is, which
serves the nation better now: The ocean as moat or the ocean as highway? Strate-
gic depth or power projection? Concentration or dispersion of force? The an-
swers to these questions bring into play the main strategic features of ocean use:
mobility, depth, influence, access. In one form or another the Navy will use these
attributes to defend the homeland, secure its economic well-being, and promote
a favorable world order.
There are, however, very substantial economic costs to global influence.
Forces “poised” in continuous forward deployment are immensely expensive.6
An effective strategy must be sustained by an appropriate budget—hence our
need for public support and for cooperative allies. As Mahan and Theodore
Roosevelt knew, the public had to want to buy those battleships. Preparedness
was a shared responsibility.
The Navy cannot write a sustainable national maritime strategy alone. Admi-
ral Mullen has noted that the Coast Guard and the Marine Corps are direct par-
ticipants in forming the new maritime strategy. He has called the Coast Guard’s
Evergreen Project the equivalent of the Navy’s maritime strategy. The recent
publication of The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and
Stewardship stresses the Coast Guard contribution to developing regimes sup-
porting American ocean policy, developing maritime domain awareness, and
close integration with the Department of Defense. The subtitle of Sea Power 21 is
Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities.
The nature of war at sea may also change. What kind of force, what kind of
strategy, what kind of friends, and what cost will be required remain open ques-
tions. The most recent report of the CNO’s Strategic Study Group 24, located in
Newport, gave a look thirty years ahead and concluded, “Future operations will
more resemble a pick-up game with neighborhood partners, or a street fight
that spontaneously erupts, than a well-planned operation conducted under con-
ditions of the U.S.’s choosing.”
What is the value of navies in preserving economic order? That is, how can the
Navy best protect the benefits we gain from use of the sea in the age of
hyperglobalization? This again suggests the value of creating good order at sea—
a strategy that includes naval force but also the creation of a cooperative frame-
work of like-minded maritime states. Our purpose here is to permit access to
materials and markets, to encourage prosperity and the favoring of political val-
ues through trade and social interchange, and to protect the position in the
global economy of our friends and allies. We can use our influence in two ways.
We can help friends—and we can hurt opponents. We can open commerce, and
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we can cut it off. We can seal off another’s moat by blockade, to take away the
value of his seaward protection. We seek to preserve economic order; we may
also be called to disrupt it. Sanctions are under way this very moment against
several states. These sanctions could get stronger. Blockade and interdiction are
traditional naval missions, and they are very serious: blockage is a belligerent act
under international law and may be considered an act of war.
A new maritime strategy must be ready for whatever the government com-
mands: sea control, sea denial, assurance, deterrence, or disruption. Or more: re-
cently the CNO instructed the newly convened Strategic Studies Group 26 to
take as its theme for the year “Fighting in Cyberspace in 2030.” He told the SSG
to “seek an appreciation of the relationship between cyberspace and the tradi-
tional maritime domains, including warfare and naval competition.”
This is the new world: naval presence in cyberspace, in the new “wide common”
of our time. U.S. policy seeks an unimpeded flow of information commodities, of
the goods and services of cyberspace. That recollects traditional Navy functions.
There must be free navigation through the sea of ether as well as on the sea of water.
In financial markets, for instance, over 95 percent of all wealth is digitally repre-
sented. Information warriors, ter-
rorists, and pirate hackers threaten
this, and thus also the security of
military communications. A great
deal of information power, over 90
percent, flows under the ocean,
through fiber-optic cables. Protection is required to ensure reliable movement of
electrons along the seafloor as well as of bulk cargo on the surface. Information
moves as commerce; movement adds value. The Navy is movement, and commer-
cial movement is something navies have always protected, or attacked.
So the Navy of a trading nation might well position itself to protect and mon-
itor bandwidths as well as merchant ships. A mobile, present Navy could grasp a
new form of sea control, guaranteeing free navigation of—if necessary, escorting—
the transmission mechanisms of the modern world.7
Also, for all-important national defense, the need to track an enemy in
cyberspace, to deprive him of this medium of action, is a top national priority
that the globally deployed and electronically endowed Navy is well equipped to
support. This again is a function of full maritime domain awareness, the basis of
effective sea power.
How can we encourage naval investment by friends and allies? Here the Depart-
ment of State could well become an active partner. The proposed Global Mari-
time Cooperation Initiative, an international network of navies that cooperate
in flexible ways on the missions suggested above, will be as much a diplomatic
2 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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project as one just among navies. In short, and for greatest value, all our mari-
time considerations must be fit together. Our national maritime strategy ex-
presses the whole, not just the parts. We must see maritime strategy whole.
A strategy, then, will show the maritime services what they are to protect,
what they are to pursue, and for what they are to prepare. It will give a common
purpose that will serve to overcome the community-based differences within
the Navy. A new maritime strategy will be an integrated naval combined-arms
concept, envisioning a force ready to fight in integrated space. A new maritime
strategy will express the way we see ourselves in respect to the world ocean and
declare what the fleet can do about it.
These purposes must be clear, and they must be realistic. In the last analysis, the
Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard cannot decline to act, but they must
be able to do what they are asked to do. A strategy is worthless if it cannot deliver
on its promise, if it sets goals without effects. That is why setting policy and strat-
egy is iterative, an interaction of ends and means, between the goal setters and the
men and women at sea. Officers must state the requirements of the maritime ser-
vices to officials who must set the nation’s expectations. Political officials must lis-
ten to the military officers, who must act. Both in turn depend on the support of
the American public. Naval effectiveness means getting the right mix of resources
and need. Naval readiness is about a national obligation to pay for and support the
force. Again: the new maritime strategy is, and must be, a shared responsibility.
A FINAL WORD ON EDUCATION AND THE IMPORTANCE
OF PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING
They say the Naval War College is about “Clausewitz and salt water.” To me, that
equals maritime security and, more broadly, maritime strategy. Let me conclude
with a brief word on the College’s historical role in shaping our understanding
of the sea and the sea services, the importance of ideas and of education in estab-
lishing the terms of maritime and national security, the importance of the edu-
cation of professional naval officers and of creating a broader public awareness
of maritime values.
I mentioned Mahan’s contribution. Eighty years after Mahan, in 1972, Vice
Admiral Stansfield Turner restated the College’s academic purpose in his convo-
cation address to its officer-students. “We must be able to produce military men
who are a match for the best of the civilian strategists, or we will abdicate control
of our profession. Our profession can only retain its vitality so long as we our-
selves are pushing the frontiers of knowledge in our field.” That is the mission of
the schoolhouse.
I end with a story about the power of ideas. In 1893 Secretary of the Navy Hilary
Herbert decided to close the Naval War College. His assistant said the College
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was “really only a dancing school” for Newport debutants. The head of the Bu-
reau of Personnel said about Mahan, “It is not the business of a naval officer to
write books,” and ordered him to sea. As Secretary Herbert boarded a dispatch
boat to go to Newport and personally close the school, his aide handed him a
copy of Mahan’s second sea power book, The Influence of Sea Power on the French
Revolution and Napoleon, 1793–1812. Herbert did not close the institution, and
on his return to Washington, he said, “This book alone is worth all the money
that has been spent on the Naval War College. When I embarked on this cruise, I
had fully intended to abolish the college; I now intend to do all in my power to
sustain it.”8 Such is the power of strategic analysis. If you look at Mahan’s book,
you will see in the preface: “Whatever success the book has is wholly and exclu-
sively due to the Naval War College, which was instituted to promote such stud-
ies.” That is why—to advance such studies—we are in conversation today.
NOTE S
This article is adapted from remarks given on
6 February 2007 at the Naval War College
during the first “Conversation with the
Country,” public sessions subsequently held
in major cities throughout the nation on be-
half of the Chief of Naval Operations to elicit
inputs to the formulation of a new maritime
strategy.
1. For a development of the notion of shared re-
sponsibility, see Douglas L. Bland, “A Unified
Theory of Civil-Military Relations,” Armed
Forces and Society 26, no. 1 (Fall 1999), pp.
7–26.
2. New York Times, 29 December 2006.
3. See a discussion of “good order at sea” in
Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the
Twenty-first Century (London: Frank Cass,
2004), chap. 10.
4. See also Barry R. Posen, “Command of the
Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S.
Hegemony,” International Security 28, no. 1
(Summer 2003), pp. 5–46.
5. Briefing of the Options Development Work-
shop, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Is-
land, 13–15 December 2006, by Professor
“Barney” Rubel, Dean of Naval Warfare
Studies and head of the College’s Maritime
Strategy project.
6. The Royal Navy defined “poise” as: “An at-
tribute of a maritime force which permits it
to remain in international waters for long pe-
riods while retaining the ability to become
engaged in events ashore or withdraw with-
out risk of embroilment.” The British also
have defined forward deployment as “naval
loitering with variable menace.”
7. For ideas on a naval role in information pro-
tection I thank Dr. Joseph Rosen. Whether, or
how, the United States would permit its mili-
tary to stand between a civilian information
society and a (potential) information enemy,
at least in peacetime, is an open question. It is
a matter of constitutionality, function, and
capability. The uses of force for this purpose,
however, can be indirect, the support of co-
operative politically and commercially critical
regions—which is what naval forces can do.
8. John B. Hattendorf et al., Sailors and Scholars:
The Centennial History of the U.S. Naval War
College (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College
Press, 1984), pp. 34–35.
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